The authors test the hypothesis that product standards harmonized to de facto international standards are less trade restrictive than ones that are not. To do this, the authors construct a new database of European Union (EU) product standards. The authors identify standards that are aligned with ISO standards (as a proxy for de facto international norms). The authors use a sample-selection gravity model to examine the impact of EU standards on African textiles and clothing exports, a sector of particular development interest.
Introduction
In a world of continued cuts in tariff rates of protection, the trade effects of non-tariff measures-including product standards-assume greater importance in research and policymaking. This is particularly true for African exporting countries, many of which now enjoy, at least in principle, substantially duty-free access to major developed country markets, in particular the European Union (EU).
Many product standards are not protectionist in intent. They may not be developed in regard to trade at all. Instead, they may respond to legitimate concerns of consumers or producers relating to, for example, product quality or fitness for purpose. There is evidence, moreover, that certain standards increase and expand trade opportunities in certain sectors (Moenius, 2004) . However, product standards can also impact the marginal and/or fixed costs of foreign exporters, and can thereby advantage domestic industries.
There is reason to believe that this problem is particularly relevant to developing country exporters, in particular in Africa. On the one hand, developing countries have largely not been involved in talks on Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and other agreements designed to mitigate compliance costs (Baldwin, 2000) . In the absence of such measures, compliance costs can be substantial. In Sub-Saharan Africa-the region that is of primary interest for this paperthe average is 7.65% of sales, but the range reported by firms runs from 0.01% to 124%. In Latin America, by contrast, the average is only about one-third as high (2.56%) and the range is much narrower (0.01% to 13.36%). A similar pattern is apparent in the last row of Table 1 , which summarizes the data for textiles and clothing producers in all sample regions. The average cost is 2.73% of sales, but the range is once again very wide: 0.01% to 44.1%. It seems reasonable to expect that part of this variation is due to differences in firm size and productivity-with the largest impacts being felt by the smallest and least productive. 2 Foreign product standards are therefore likely to be a particular constraint on small and medium-sized businesses, which makes this issue a vital one for developing countries seeking to stimulate that part of the economy via increased contact with world markets.
Even in the presence of significant compliance costs for exporters, however, the trade policy question in this area cannot simply be one of "rolling back" product standards, as if they were protectionist tariffs or quotas. Rather, the emphasis should be on limiting-where present-the negative spillovers that legitimate product standards can have for exporters in other countries.
This is the difficult line that the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade traces. One
way the Agreement attempts to do so is by encouraging the use of de facto international standards: Article 2.5, for example, creates a rebuttable presumption that technical regulations aligned with international standards do not constitute "unnecessary obstacles to international trade". The idea is relatively simple: complying with one "international" standard-and there can be any number of de facto "international" standards-should be less costly for all concerned than complying with multiple national or regional standards, and help promote a relatively level playing field for exporters.
This paper presents the first empirical evidence to indicate the potential benefit in the approach taken by the WTO Agreement on TBTs. We show that EU product standards harmonized with international standards restrict African textiles and clothing exports far less than do European
Union standards not aligned with international norms. Thus, international harmonization of product standards could be seen as an important complementary policy in support of recent efforts to extend more generous and easily accessible preferences to the developing world (see e.g., Collier and Venables, 2007) . As Brenton and Hoppe (2007) argue, expanding African exports of manufactured goods in traditional development sectors, such as clothing, is much more than just a question of preferential rates of duty.
Our results are consistent with a framework in which standards impact trade through at least two channels. Compliance with standards increases the marginal costs of exporting and thereby can reduce export flows (the intensive margin of trade). At the same time, exporters must also pay a fixed cost to adapt products to suit foreign standards. This can reduce the probability that a country will export at all (the extensive margin). Our results provide support for the proposition that it is possible to reduce the fixed and marginal costs associated with product standards by using de facto international standards as the basis for harmonization.
Our results build on and extend the existing literature in three ways. 3 First, we use the Perinorm database (Swann et al., 1999; Moenius, 2000 Moenius, , 2004 Moenius, , 2006 and the online catalogue of the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) to create an original database of EU product standards applied to textiles and clothing. Our data distinguish between standards that are equivalent to ISO standards-a proxy for international harmonization-and those that are not.
This allows us to address a different policy question from the one examined by, for example, Moenius (2004 Moenius ( , 2006 . In these papers, the author focuses on the extent to which bilaterallyshared standards promote trade. Disdier et al. (2007) , and Baller (2007) . These studies generally find some evidence that product standards impact negatively on trade with "outsiders"-i.e., those countries outside the harmonization zone. The effect is not uniform, however, and tends to vary from one sector to another (see also Moenius, 2004 ).
Third, we examine the trade impacts of product standards both at the extensive and intensive margins. Our results therefore complement existing analyses on mandatory standards (Chen and Mattoo, 2006; Baller, 2007) and firm-level survey data (Chen et al., 2006) . Moreover, in specifying an over-identified version of our sample selection gravity model, we also produce evidence corroborating recent theoretical work on the importance of credit constraints in trade models with fixed costs. Our results can be interpreted as supporting the view that standards create fixed product adaptation costs, which need to be financed (e.g., Chaney, 2005; Manova, 2006) .
Against this background, our paper proceeds as follows. The next Section describes the EU's approach to product standardization and harmonization, and its interactions with WTO disciplines. We then outline the World Bank EU Standards Database in Section 3, contrast it with previous data collection efforts, and present some descriptive results. Section 4 contains our gravity model specification and empirical results. We draw some policy conclusions in Section 5, and sketch a number of possible directions for future research.
Product Standards and Harmonization in the European Union
It is easy to get lost in the terminology that has grown up around product standards. As such, it is important to outline, in brief, the concepts we address here. In this Section, we also outline the legal regime governing product standards and harmonization in the EU, as well as its interactions with WTO disciplines. 1995-2003. 5 In this Section, we briefly discuss our methodology, compare it with alternative approaches, and present some basic descriptive results from the World Bank EU Standards Database (EUSDB).
As discussed above, there are no New Approach Directives covering the textiles and clothing sector. It is therefore not possible to use dummy variables for the application of Directives, as was done in previous work such as Brenton et al. (2001) , Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006), Mattoo (2004), and Baller (2007) .
One alternative would be to use TBT notification data from the WTO, as in Fontagné et al. (2005) and Disdier et al. (2007) . 6 However, we do not favor that approach for two reasons. First, WTO rules only require Members to notify technical regulations, not product standards (Article
of the Agreement on TBTs). Given the importance of voluntary product standards in Europe,
it seems unduly restrictive to focus only on mandatory measures. Second, it is far from clear that individual Members interpret Article 2.9 in the same way, thereby raising concerns of data consistency. For instance, Belgium has lodged 207 TBT notifications since 1995, whereas
Ireland has apparently not submitted any. 7 It seems unlikely that such a large discrepancy can be fully explained by substantive differences in standardization practices between the two countries.
As a result, we are not convinced that WTO notifications data always provide an accurate picture of the standards environment in all Members.
In assembling the World Bank EU Standards Database), we follow the approach of Swann et al. (1996) and Moenius (2000 Moenius ( , 2004 Moenius ( , 2006 . We rely primarily on Perinorm (www.perinorm.com), an extremely rich bibliographic database maintained by the British, French, and German standard-setting bodies. It contains over 1.1 million records from 22 (mostly OECD) countries.
Each record corresponds to a single national, regional, or international standard. It provides a short verbal description, from which it is usually possible to identify the product or sector to which the standard applies. Perinorm also indicates when links exist to equivalent standards in other jurisdictions, including at the regional (CEN) and international (ISO) levels. It is therefore possible to identify with precision both the stock of EU standards, and the subset of them that translate ISO norms into local practice. We refer to this second category of European standards as being "harmonized with ISO standards" or "internationally harmonized".
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It is important to highlight that Perinorm is not primarily intended as a tool for research. On the one hand, this is a strength: Perinorm is designed to facilitate industry access to-and purchase of-product standards, which suggests that there is a commercial incentive to ensure completeness. 9 This end-user focus makes Perinorm somewhat unwieldy for doing applied international trade work. In particular, Perinorm classifies standards according to the International Classification for Standards (ICS), for which there is no concordance to the product classifications commonly used in trade analysis. For textiles and clothing, the ICS is relatively imprecise in its classifications: heading 61.020 "clothes" is distinguished from 61.040
"headgear" and 61.060 "footwear", but it is not possible to drill down to any lower level of disaggregation. We therefore have to rely both on the ICS classification and on verbal descriptions to manually map standards to Harmonized System products.
The data collection process for the World Bank database works as follows. First, Perinorm is searched for EU standards (coded as "EN"), and basic information is extracted manually from individual records. We limit attention to those documents identified as "standards" by Perinorm, and exclude all other document types included in the database. (Moenius, 2000, identifies 39 partially overlapping document types in Perinorm.) Data captured for each standard include the dates of entry into force and withdrawal, and a 1-0 dummy variable indicating harmonization with an ISO standard. That variable is coded according to whether or not Perinorm includes an ISO standard in its list of linked standards within each record, along with a code indicating that it is "equivalent" or "identical". In the second stage, each standard is mapped to one or more HS 4-digit products using the short, verbal description provided by Perinorm, as well as its ICS code.
Next, we cross-check all of the above information against CEN's online standards catalogue (http://www.cen.eu/catweb/cwsen.htm). Then finally, we produce simple counts of the number of standards affecting each HS 2-and 4-digit product category over the period 1995-2003. A standard is considered to be in force for a given year if it came into force before or during that year. If it is withdrawn at some point during the year, it is still assumed to be in force for the entire year. Amendments to existing standards are counted as additional standards.
It is useful to provide a simple example of the above process. (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . First, EU standards are distributed unevenly across sub-sectors (Table 3 and Figure 1 ). Clothing accounts for only a modest fraction of the overall number of harmonized standards, a little over 10%. The main standardization activity has been in relation to fibers and fabrics, each of which account for around 45% of the total number of harmonized standards. This division is reasonably constant throughout the sample period.
Meanwhile, Table 4 and Figure 2 show that aggregating across sub-sectors, the share of internationally harmonized EU standards increased between 1995 and 1999, before falling for the remainder of the period. The overall movement involved is not large, however: the extreme shares are 45% and 56%. A more stark contrast appears when we compare the experiences of the 10 The correspondence table in Moenius (2000) between ICS and SITC categories discloses the same dynamic.
three sub-sectors. The share of harmonized standards for both clothes and fabrics increases markedly over the sample period, from an admittedly low baseline in both cases (Tables 5-6 and Figures 3-4). However, the opposite dynamic is apparent for fibers: the share of harmonized standards rises slightly between 1995 and 1998, but then falls markedly for the remainder of the period (Table 6 and Figure 5 ). The contrast between the three sub-sectors at the end of the sample period is also interesting: for fibers, over 80% of standards are harmonized with ISO standards, while the figure is just 20% for clothes and a little under 30% for fabrics.
It is important to stress that at this stage, the World Bank data covers Community-level standards only. Since the standard setting body in each EU Member State is required to translate such norms into local standards, our data therefore also capture part of the standardization activity of each individual country. However, we do not currently have data on country-specific standards in EU Member States. There are two main reasons for this. First, data availability in Perinorm varies considerably from country to country. Without any simple cross-check, such as the CEN online catalog, it is difficult to be sure that a dataset of national standards is in fact capturing all relevant information. Second, standardization at the country level has been ongoing for a much longer time span that at the regional level. As a result, it is necessary to go much further back in history in order to make a reliable assessment of the total stock of standards in force at any given time. Not unexpectedly, Perinorm's coverage becomes more patchy the further back one goes (Moenius, 2000) , thus rendering it particularly difficult to obtain accurate stock information for those countries with a long history of standardization.
Model and Estimation Results
In this Section, we provide some basic intuition for the empirical question we are examining in this paper. We then present our empirical model and estimation results. We keep the theoretical presentation highly stylized in order to make the basic mechanisms as clear as possible.
Starting from a benchmark of free and standard-less trade, the introduction of foreign product standards imposes two sorts of costs on exporters. On the one hand, there is a fixed cost of product adaptation to meet the foreign standard. In addition, there is the marginal cost of demonstrating conformity, in addition to any higher per unit production costs the standard itself may imply. Tables 8-10 For simplicity, we assume that the costs of compliance are uniform across countries.
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Intuitively, there are two main channels through which standards can affect trade flows. 12 On the one hand, higher variable costs mean that exporting firms tend to export less due to the presence of increased trade frictions. But in addition, higher fixed costs make it harder for producers to export at all, since the hurdle they must jump in order to gain access to a foreign market is higher. In other words, standards can plausibly be linked both to effects on export volume and the propensity to export (Chen et al., 2006; Baller, 2007; Chen and Mattoo, 2006) .
Next, we consider introduction of an internationally harmonized standard in one potential export market. 13 This means that the same standard applies in that market as in a composite "rest of the world" region. By comparison with a standard-less benchmark, this scenario will still tend to reduce trade through the two mechanisms discussed in the previous paragraph. That effect will generally be weaker than if each harmonizing country implemented its own distinct standard:
instead of paying one fixed and variable market access cost for the whole region, an exporter would have to pay multiple costs.
Consolidating the foregoing, we expect that standards will generally exhibit a negative impact on trade, but that such effects will be mitigated when these standards are aligned with de facto international standards. Given the data we have available, our working hypothesis is therefore the following: EU standards that are harmonized with international standards (proxied here by ISO standards) exert a less negative impact on African export volumes and propensity than those standards which are not. 
Empirical Model
To examine this hypothesis, we use a standard gravity model of international trade applied to data on EU-15 imports of textiles and clothing from Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 11 for 13 We assume that the fixed and variable costs of compliance do not vary too much across standards. We are therefore in the "horizontal" standards paradigm, in which differing norms reflect culturally influenced preferences and traditions rather than objective restrictiveness (Baldwin, 2000) .
14 Since the policy question that motivates our research relates to the differential effect of harmonized versus nonharmonized standards, it is not strictly necessary for us to make any particular hypothesis as to the sign of the individual coefficients. It should still be possible to test our hypothesis even in the presence of the type of positive information effects found by Moenius (2004) .
variable definitions and sources, and Table 12 for countries included in the sample). Our sample period is 1995-2003. As previously noted, individual EU standards in this area often tend to cut across numerous HS product lines, which makes it desirable to aggregate the trade data to a higher level of generality. We therefore retain the distinction between clothes (HS 61-63), fabrics (HS 56-60), and fibers (HS 50-55) that was used above, and we aggregate all data to those categories.
We take the micro-founded gravity model formulation of Van Wincoop (2003, 2004) as our starting point:
Where:
k ijt X = Exports from country i to country j in sector k for year t; We modify the bilateral trade costs component of the standard model so as to explicitly include our standards counts, differentiating between the number of EU standards that are harmonized with ISO standards (stds_iso) and the number that are not (stds_non). The trade cost function also includes, as is usual in this literature, the distance between pairs of trading countries (dist), and dummy variables to take account of important geographical and cultural links such as a common border (contig), colonial links (colony) and a common official language (comlang_off). 15 We therefore specify: In principle, it would also be necessary for the trade costs coefficients to vary across sectors due to differences in the intra-sectoral elasticity of substitution. However, this approach necessitates estimation of a large number of parameters. In order to obtain useful results, it requires substantial variation at a very fine level in the independent variables. For our baseline model (3), we therefore prefer a simpler formulation using fixed effects only in the exporter (θ j ), importer (δ i ), product (ψ k ), and year (τ t ) dimensions. These fixed effects control for country- imports .
Zero or missing trade flows are excluded from the effective sample in (3), which has been shown to bias the resulting coefficient estimates (e.g., Helpman et al., 2007) . Moreover, (3) on its own does not allow us to say anything about the second part of our working hypothesis, which has to do with export propensity.
To address these two problems together, we use a Heckman (1979) sample selection model. 16 It postulates two equations, namely an outcome equation which takes the form of (3), and a selection equation. The selection equation determines the probability that a given observation is included in the effective sample for the outcome equation. The two equations are linked by a correlation ρ, which compensates for the sample selection bias that would otherwise pertain. For the time being, we assume that the same explanatory variables appear in both equations. The model is therefore just-identified, and parameter estimates can be obtained by maximum likelihood estimation of the two equations jointly. (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004 , argue that it is desirable for the model to be over-identified, and we return to this point below.)
Before moving to our empirical results, it is important to address the question of possible endogeneity of our standards count variables stds_iso, and stds_non. The number of standards in a particular sector could, in a general sense, be endogenous to imports through a political economy process. However, none of the African countries we are dealing with here has a large European market share. It is therefore unlikely that sector-wide standards-which apply to both domestic production and imports from all sources-are set in response to unexpectedly large imports from a single African country in a single year. Although we do not expect major endogeneity problems in this case, we ensure the robustness of our results by using alternately current and lagged standards counts (one, two, and five years).
Baseline Results
We now move on to our results (Table 13) . OLS estimates (Column 1) have coefficients with the expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. Amongst the standard gravity variables, distance is negative and statistically significant, while a colonial relationship (statistically significant) and common official language (statistically insignificant) are both positive. We find that both of our standards counts lstds_iso and lstds_non are negative. However, only the coefficient on lstds_non is statistically significant. It is also of far greater magnitude than the coefficient on lstds_iso-the two differ by a factor of around five-which suggests that in terms of both economic and statistical significance, it is primarily non-harmonized EU standards which exert a negative impact on African textiles and clothing exports. While there is evidence of a negative effect also for harmonized standards, it is much weaker. A formal hypothesis test of equality between the two coefficients confirms this view (rejection at the 5% level).
Columns 2-3 of Table 13 present results for the baseline Heckman (1979) model, in which the selection and outcome equations both have the same set of explanatory variables (i.e., the model is just-identified). Coefficient estimates in the outcome equation are broadly comparable with the OLS case, but there are some important differences in terms of economic and statistical significance. The distance elasticity increases (in absolute value terms) from -1.5 to -2.5, and is significant at the 1% level. Both the colonial link and common official language dummies are now significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, and the coefficient for the latter is considerably larger. We take these changes as evidence that, in the present context, the presence of zero trade flows in our dataset can lead to noticeable bias if OLS estimates are not corrected. This is supported by the relatively high estimated correlation between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations (Rho=0.66).
In terms of our variables of primary interest, namely lstds_iso and lstds_non, we find that
Heckman estimation makes a significant change to the latter only: its coefficient is now larger in absolute value than under OLS, -0.8 versus -0.5. The coefficient on internationally harmonized EU standards remains negative but statistically insignificant, and is now smaller in absolute value than the coefficient on non-harmonized standards by a factor of nearly ten. Again, a formal hypothesis test confirms the significance of the difference between the two coefficients at the 1% level.
In addition to correcting some apparent bias in the OLS estimates, the Heckman results also contain some useful information in their own right. We interpret the estimated coefficients of the selection equation as summarizing the impact of different variables not directly on trade flows, but on the propensity to export. Following Helpman et al. (2007) , we can go further and relate the selection equation to fixed cost effects, and the outcome equation to marginal cost effects.
With this interpretation in mind, we can see that the results in column 3 of Table 13 are consistent with sensible analytical priors as to coefficient sign: distance is negative and statistically significant, while colonial links and a common official language are both positive and statistically significant.
Interestingly, we find that non-harmonized European standards exert a negative and statistically significant influence on export propensity. However, standards that are aligned with ISO standards carry a statistically insignificant and (slightly) positive coefficient. These standards impact export propensity only very weakly, but to the extent that we can measure such an impact, it would appear that these types of EU standards actually increase export propensity (cf.
Moenius, 2004).
The combined results from the selection and outcome equations therefore suggest that EU standards not harmonized to international norms tend to impose significant added costs on exporters, both fixed and variable. In both the selection and outcome equations, the difference in impact between ISO and non-ISO standards is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Robustness Checks
The above discussion is subject to a well-known caveat: the estimated coefficients from a justidentified Heckman model like the one presented in Columns 2-3 of Table 13 tend to exhibit considerable instability (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004) . It is preferable to specify an over- Business Report. The disadvantage of using data from Doing Business is that they are only available for the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Given that our sample runs between 1995 and 2003, it is not feasible in our case to take the same approach as Helpman et al. (2007) .
We therefore propose an alternative. In developing countries, and particularly in Africa, firms' ability to cover the fixed costs of complying with foreign standards is influenced by the level of financial development in the exporting country. If credit is expensive and/or hard to come by, then it will be more difficult for firms to pay the fixed costs of exporting. We therefore expect a measure of exporter financial development to be directly correlated with export propensity.
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Even though such a measure could conceivably be correlated with export-conditional trade flows as well-since firms might need credit to support ongoing costs in addition to the fixed costs of startup-we expect that the connection will be much weaker, thereby justifying inclusion of financial development in the selection equation but not in the outcome equation. 18 (For recent theoretical work in this vein, see Chaney, 2005, and Manova, 2006.) Results from this approach are presented in Columns 4-5 of Table 13 . As expected, financial development-as measured by domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP-is positively and significantly (5%) associated with export propensity. 19 We interpret this as indicating that credit constraints can exert a significant impact on African textiles and clothing exporters. All other estimated coefficients have the same signs and very similar magnitudes to 17 We leave it to future research to examine the possible role of foreign direct investment in loosening the credit constraint postulated here. 18 We check this assumption empirically by conducting an additional regression (not reported) that includes financial development in both the selection and outcome equations. We find, as expected, that the coefficient is positive and 5% significant in the former, but positive and insignificant at the 10% level in the latter. In all other respects, results are very similar to those reported in Columns 4-5 of Table 13 . (Cf. Manova, 2006 , who finds evidence that financial development is significant in both the selection and outcome equations.)
those obtained using the just-identified Heckman model discussed above. That our results are consistent in this way suggests that our conclusions are robust to the parameter instability that is often a feature of just-identified Heckman models.
As noted above, another potential difficulty with our results is the possible endogeneity of our standards measures. To deal with this issue, we re-run the model in columns 4-5 of Table 13 using one, two, and five period lags of lstds_iso and lstds_non. Table 14 presents our results.
Qualitatively, they are identical to those from our baseline model: non-ISO standards exert a negative impact on trade values and export propensity, although the latter relationship is only statistically significant at the 10% level in one of the three formulations. The estimated coefficients on harmonized standards, on the other hand, are uniformly positive. With two lags, the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level in the selection equation, while with five lags it is 5% significant in the outcome equation. In all cases except one-the selection equation for the model using five lags-the difference between the estimated coefficients on harmonized and non-harmonized standards is statistically significant at the 1% level. If anything, accounting for endogeneity by using lags tends to strengthen our initial results.
As a final robustness check, we re-estimate the baseline model using the Poisson estimator advocated by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . Those authors show that Poisson produces consistent estimates in the presence of zero trade values. Moreover, the estimator is known to be consistent under relatively weak assumptions (i.e., the data need not follow a Poisson process at all), and it does not suffer from the incidental parameters problem which generally gives rise to inconsistency and bias concerns in nonlinear fixed effects models (including the Heckman model). 20 It therefore represents a flexible and increasingly common alternative to the Heckman estimator in a gravity context, even though it comes at the price of losing direct information on export propensity.
Poisson results are presented in column 6 of Most importantly, we find that non-harmonized standards have an estimated coefficient which is negative and 1% significant, while the coefficient on harmonized standards is slightly positive but statistically insignificant. Once again, a formal test rejects the null hypothesis of equality between the two coefficients at the 1% level. We can be confident, therefore, that our results are robust to the use of this common alternative estimator.
Conclusion
We have shown that there is empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that EU standards harmonized with international norms (proxied here by ISO standards) exert a less negative impact on African export volumes and propensity than standards which are not harmonized.
While previous empirical work has supported the existence of an insider-outsider dynamic in terms of the trade effects of standardization, this paper is, to our knowledge, the first to consider explicitly the impact of international harmonization.
20 On these points, see Greene (2004) and Wooldridge (1997) .
The policy implications of these results are of significant interest. On the one hand, our analysis suggests that it is indeed appropriate for the WTO Agreement on TBTs to champion the use of international standards whenever possible. If Members follow this path, they can help limit the negative effects of standardization and harmonization on outsiders-and in particular, on developing countries. However, our evidence-combined with existing results due to Swann et al. (1996) and Moenius (2004 Moenius ( , 2006 -suggests that it is not just mandatory technical regulations that can have significant trade impacts, but voluntary product standards as well. As previously noted, the WTO's treatment of these two groups of norms is asymmetric: technical regulations are subject to relatively stringent requirements that are directly enforceable through WTO dispute settlement proceedings, whereas the position for product standards is considerably more blurred. There may well be a case to be made in the future for redressing this imbalance.
In regard to future research work in this area, we view three areas of particular interest. First, it will be important to test the applicability of our findings to other sectors, in particular those that are of export interest to developing countries. Second-and flowing from the previous pointthere is likely to be a high payoff from investing in improved data in this area. Research on nontariff measures generally, and product standards in particular, suffers from a chronic lack of detailed, reliable, and comprehensive data. Clearly a major effort is required to remedy this situation, in particular if attention is to be paid both to mandatory technical regulations and voluntary product standards.
Finally, the World Bank EU standards database discloses significant cross-sectoral differences in the number and type (harmonized or not) of standards. Future work could usefully investigate the determinants of that variation. Just as political economy has proved a useful tool for analyzing -25 -cross-sectoral variation in trade policy measures, so too do we expect it to play an important role in elucidating similar variation in standard setting behavior. 
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